The deliberative turn in political philosophy sees theorists attempting to ground democratic legitimacy in free, rational, and public deliberation among citizens. However, feminist theorists have criticized prominent accounts of deliberative democracy, and of the public sphere that is its site, for being too exclusionary. Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser, and Seyla Benhabib show that deliberative democrats generally fail to attend to substantive inclusion in their conceptions of deliberative space, even though they endorse formal inclusion. If we take these criticisms seriously, we are tasked with articulating a substantively inclusive account of deliberation. I argue in this article that enriching existing theories of deliberative democracy with Fricker's conception of epistemic in/justice yields two specific benefits. First, it enables us to detect instances of epistemic injustice, and therefore failures of inclusion, within deliberative spaces. Second, it can act as a model for constructing deliberative spaces that are more inclusive and therefore better able to ground democratic legitimacy.
The value turn in epistemology generated a particularly influential new position - virtue epistemology. It is an increasingly influential epistemological normative approach that opts for the intellectual virtues of the epistemic agent, rather than the truth-value of the proposition, as the central epistemic value. In the first part of this article we will attempt to briefly explain the value turn and outline the basic aspects of virtue epistemology, underlining the diversity of epistemic attitudes associated with this approach and their positive impact on expanding epistemological horizons. The second part will be focused on the virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate for evaluating social processes such as, for example, testimony and conversational practices in general. In the third section we will show how the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic communicational act can be more efficiently analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of the virtue of epistemic justice, than from the traditional epistemic approach based on a monist concept of truth. The fourth and fifth section synthesize the discussion by introducing the concept of hermeneutic psychotherapy as a therapeutically and epistemically favorable framework for evaluating communicational acts in psychotherapy.
Intro -- Series Foreword The Community Psychology Book Series: A Dialogical Decolonizing Space -- Prologue Decolonial Psychology as a Counter-Catastrophic Science -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Contributors -- Tracking the Decolonial Turn in Contemporary Community Psychology: Expanding Socially Just Knowledge Archives, Ways of Being and Modes of Praxis -- Decoloniality as Paradigmatic -- The Centrality of Epistemic Justice in Decoloniality -- A Moment of Social Reckoning and Transformation? -- Psychology's Decolonial Turn -- Centre, Periphery and the Elasticity of Coloniality -- Praxis Co-ordinates for Decoloniality, Knowledge Production and Epistemic Justice -- Archival Reclamation and Expansion for Onto-Epistemic Disruption -- Knowledge from Below, Centring Voices/Subjects from the Margins, and Epistemic Justice -- Critical Mutual Accompaniment, Intersectional Identities, and Dialogical Ethics -- Conclusion -- References -- Africa's Knowledge Archives, Black Consciousness and Reimagining Community Psychology -- African Archives: Representations, Rupture and Retrieval -- Black Consciousness as an Insurgent Archive in Community Psychology -- Conclusion -- References -- An Orienting Conversation on Africa(n)-Centred Decolonial Community Psychologies -- What Kind of Knowledge Device is Conversation, and is it Really a Meaningful Way of Creating Knowledge? -- What is "The Thing" to Which we Wish to Turn in our Conversation? -- Why is there Still Epistemological Domination Decades After the So-Called Classic Era of Colonisation? -- What Can Decolonial Africa(n)-Centring Community Psychologies Do to Resist Dominant Euro-American Models of Community Psychology? -- How Might we Create Space for Decolonial Africa(n)-Centredness in Community Psychologies?.
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I am a storyteller. I believe in the power of stories to share experiences and to elucidate thoughts and ideas and to help us to make sense of complex social practices. This thesis includes the stories of five young women who were learning to become teachers. As they shared their stories with me, I share them with you. This study includes their stories of receiving feedback. These stories are structured within the Narrative Inquiry dimensions of temporality, place and context. These dimensions suggest that stories are historical and move through time, stories are shaped by place and the context in which they unfold (Clandinin, 2013). Furthermore, these stories demonstrate how feedback can serve to give access to powerful knowledge and can serve to recognise who our students are and what they bring to the academy (Hordern, 2018). But feedback can also serve to misrecognise. Much has been written and reported about the barriers preventing students from acting on the feedback on their assignment tasks in higher education. In this study, I argue that feedback is a pedagogic practice that can support students to gain epistemic access. Feedback can only achieve this if it makes the expectations explicit for students to make sense of and make meaning for themselves and if it is offered in a dialogical format which recognises the students, their attempts, their identities, and their knowledge. The research question of this study, 'How do experiences of forms of feedback affect female undergraduate student teachers' chances of epistemic access?', is not unusual. There have been many research projects that have been carried out that examine students' experiences of feedback (for example, Evans, 2013; Basey, Maines, & Francis, 2014; Nicol et al.; 2014; Carless, 2019; Winstone et al., 2021). But I identified a gap where feedback has not, to my knowledge, been studied directly through the lenses of Epistemic Justice towards Parity of Participation. This study interpreted five undergraduate student teachers' feedback experiences through these lenses. Narrative inquiry enabled me to design this study in ways that foregrounded experience. Data was collected through multiple conversations during which I organised the participants' life stories of feedback within the dimensions of temporality, place and context, and sociality. Miranda Fricker's (2007) theory of Epistemic Justice and Fraser's norm of Parity of Participation (2000) framed this study. I engaged with Fricker and Fraser's literature meaningfully as a reader and researcher. I established an understanding of how the lenses offered by Fraser and Fricker allowed me to make sense of the literature more generally, in social life and on the pedagogic practice of feedback. Fricker's theory of Epistemic Justice considers the epistemically unjust, gendered, raced and classed, experiences of epistemic agents. Fricker (2007) draws on two central concepts to account for epistemic injustices: Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice. Fricker (2007; 2003) explains that testimonial injustice occurs within a testimonial exchange setting, when an epistemic agent as a speaker gives testimony of the epistemic agent's experiences and knowledge but is not awarded the credibility the speaker deserves (Fricker, 2003). Epistemic agents who participate in a testimonial exchange need to overcome bias and prejudice in order to evaluate testimonies with the degree of fairness the testimony deserves (Fricker, 2013; 2016). Hermeneutical injustice occurs when an epistemic agent is unable to make sense and make meaning of their social experiences. Hermeneutical injustice strengthens when the epistemic agent is prevented from gaining access to resources that might help with sense making and meaning making of these social experiences (Dielman, 2012; Fricker, 2016). To ensure that meaning can be made between people and groups of people, there needs to be some shared understandings of the purpose and process of sense making and meaning-making – or a willingness to co-create such shared understandings. Fraser's norm of Participatory Parity enabled a consideration of the larger world of political and economic systems that give rise to social injustice. In this study, the theories of Fricker and Fraser are used to illuminate experiences of feedback of the five undergraduate student teachers who are the participants in this study and how these translate to epistemic and social injustice. The norm of Participatory Parity is considered where feedback allowed or restricted participants from participating on an equal footing in the feedback process. Narrative inquiry, a research methodology that is used to study experiences, was used to inform research strategies of this study. Participants' experiences, data collection and organising the narratives demonstrated the dimensions of temporality and space. The thesis includes biographical vignettes for each of the participants in the study, interspersed with data from across all five participants. The key findings of this study show that feedback generally operates at the surface levels of grammar correction. In light of the theoretical lenses of this study, I argue that the feedback experiences they shared generally did not recognise their attempts and the identities and knowledges they brought to the tasks. Because the focus was on superficial correction of the specific task, the feedback failed to create conditions for the (re)distribution of knowledge. At times the feedback exerted power on participants. Because the feedback was generally in the form of one directional correction (with little space for interaction with the feedback or dialogue with the assessor), this caused status subordination of participants in the epistemic spaces of teaching practice. Lastly, the lack of clarity of feedback was harmful to the potential for dialogical feedback. Such feedback caused participants to experience forms of epistemic injustice in the form of hermeneutical injustice where it failed to create conditions for the distribution of knowledge. Feedback also caused participants to experience testimonial injustice where it failed to create conditions for recognising participants' processes of sense-making and meaning-making in the various assignment tasks. Participatory Parity could not occur because the processes of recognition and redistribution were constrained. Feedback then created fertile conditions of epistemic injustice to occur, and participants were likely to have failed to gain the much needed epistemic access. This study is not the story of bad, uncaring academics; the study acknowledges the context of large classes and heavy workloads in which feedback is or is not given. Rather, this is the story of five women trying to make their way through the university and out into the world as teachers. The study calls for better theorising of feedback and more support for both academics and students to develop feedback literacy so that feedback might serve as a dialogical pedagogic practice that enables epistemic justice. ; Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Education, Centre for Higher Education Research, Teaching and Learning, 2022
AbstractNoninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) promises to enhance women's reproductive autonomy by providing genetic information about the fetus, especially in the detection of genetic impairments like Down syndrome (DS). In practice, however, NIPT provides opportunities for intensified manipulation and control over women's reproductive decisions. Applying Miranda Fricker's concept ofepistemic injusticeto prenatal screening, this article analyzes how medical professionals impair reproductive decision-making by perpetuating testimonial injustice. They do so by discrediting positive parental testimony about what it is like to raise a child with DS. We argue that this testimonial injustice constitutes a twofold harm: (1) people with DS and their family members who claim that parenting a child with DS may be a rewarding and joyous experience are harmed when they are systematically silenced, disbelieved, and/or denied epistemic credibility by medical professionals, and (2) pregnant women are harmed since they might make poorly informed choices without access to all relevant information. The broader implication of the analysis is that epistemic justice is a precondition of reproductive autonomy. We conclude by calling for federal oversight of the acquisition and dissemination of information that prospective parents receive following a positive diagnosis of DS to ensure that it is comprehensive and up to date.
This study of a postcolonial site engages with epistemic justice from the perspective of language. It understands epistemic justice as relating to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. It suggests that monoglossic language-in-education policies, often colonial in origin, constitute a form of epistemic injustice by denying learners the opportunity to learn in a familiar language and removing their ability to make epistemic contributions, a capacity central to human value. It further suggests that translanguaging in formal school settings is for the most part geared towards a monolingual outcome, that is, towards accessing knowledge in an official language. This unidirectional impetus means that translanguaging remains an affirmative rather than transformative strategy, leaving underlying hierarchies of value and relations of knowing unchanged. In contrast, this study presents linguistic ethnographic data from a three-year pilot project in Cape Town where primary school learners could choose their medium of instruction to Grade 6 and use all languages in subject classrooms. It analyses how a Grade 6 learner used laminated, multilingual, affective and epistemic stances to construct others as knowers, negotiate epistemic authority, and promote solidarity. It proposes that, in so doing, she constructed new decolonial relations of knowing and being. It further proposes that the shift from a monolingual to a multilingual episteme, which substantially improved educational performance overall, also enabled the emergence of politically fragile yet institutionally robust social, epistemic, and moral orders from below, orders that could lay the basis for greater epistemic justice. ; Towards Epistemic Justice: Language, Identity, and Relations of Knowing in Post-colonial Schools ; Multilingualism and identities in and out of school: urban youth on the Cape Flats